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Abstract 
This paper examines the symbiosis between financial development 
and human capital accumulation in generating endogenous growth. We 
develop a  theoretical model where  human  capital is  a key  factor in 
the creation of  financial innovations, resulting in financial development 
which in turns facilitates the acquisition of  new human capital. Compar- 
ing the steady state solutions of  the decentralized model with those of 
a hypothetical social planner reveals two sources of  divergence between 
the solutions. In addition, we explore the comparative statics and tran- 
sitional dynamics of  these models, and examine their key implications 
for policy-makers. 
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1  Introduction 
The role of  human capital in producing sustained economic growth has been 
widely studied since the emergence of  New  Growth Theory in the mid-tdate 
1980s. The most cited paper in this body of  work is Lucas (1988), who in turn 
drew on much earlier work by Arrow (1962) and Uzawa (1965). In this class 
of theoretical growth models, a greater level of productivity in human capital 
production leads to a higher steady-state growth rate. More recently, a broad 
literature on finance and growth (surveyed in Levine  (1997)) has surfaced. 
Financial development, it is argued, influences economic growth by removing 
borrowing constraints, by  improving the management of  risk, by  facilitating 
information acquisition and resource allocation, by  enabling the monitoring of  managers and the exerting of  corporate control, by mobilizing savings, and 
by  csncouraging efficiency-enhancing  specialization.  Many  empirical studies 
have found that variables indicating the extent of  financial development are 
positively correlated with overall growth rates, total factor productivity and 
factor accumulation.  For  example,  Benhabib and Spiegel  (2000)  find that 
financial development variables such as the ratio of  liquid liabilities of  the 
financial sector to GDP (a proxy for the overall size of  the formal financial 
' -&,-- 
intermediary sector) and the ratio of  deposit-money bank domestic-assets to 
depost-money bank assets plus central-bank domestic assets (a variable King 
and Levine (1993) believe emphasizes the risk-sharing and information services 
offered by banks) have statistically significant effects on investment in human 
capital. 
:In this paper, we  aim  to bring these two strands of  work  together in a 
threesector growth model with endogenous human capital accumulation and 
financial innovation.  In our model, human capital is a key  input in creating 
financial innovations, resulting in financial development which in turns facili- 
tates the acquisition of  new human capital.  Financial innovations result in a 
larger aggregate stock of  financial products, which improves the intermediation 
process in transforming the savings of  household into productive investment 
by :b.  In addition, financial innovations facilitate the financing of  human 
capital acquisition, raising the rate at which new human capital is produced. 
Although previous papers do not model the financial sector in the context of  a 
macroeconomic growth model, they have investigated the link between borrow- 
ing constraints, human capital accumulation and growth.  In contrast to pa- 
pers such as Japelli and Pagano (1994) which argue that borrowing constraints 
promote growth by encouraging savings, de Gregorio (1996) presents an OLG 
model of  a small open economy  where borrowing constraints have negative 
effects  on growth because the inability of  individuals to borrow against future 
income reduces the incentives for human capital accumulation. Christou (1993) 
develops a neoclassical growth model with borrowing constraints and obtains 
similar results by  simulating the model.  Buiter and Kletzer (1995) make the 
same argument using a model where individuals must self-finance their train- 
ing costs, whereas de Gregorio (1996) assume that education is free and focus 
on the trade-off between working and studying.  Finally, Barro, Mankiw, and 
Sala-1-Martin (1995) discuss the implications of  borrowing constraints in the 
fincmcing of  education for convergence of  income across countries. 
Our model suggests that productivity parameters in  the-financial inno- 
vations and human capital sectors affect the steady-state growth rate of  the 
economy, as does the magnitude of  the spillover effect from the stock of  fi- 
nancial products on  human capital accumulation, highlighting the symbiotic 
relationship between the two sectors. The solutions to the competitive, decen- tralized version of  the model and that of  a hypothetical social planner reveal 
multiple sources of  divergence. We  also examine the transitional dynamics of 
the model and discuss its ramifications for policy-making. 
This paper is organized as follows:  the next section presents a brief primer 
on  the nature and types of  financial innovations.  In  section 3, we  present 
our three-sector growth model korporating financial innovations and human 
capital accumulation, analyze the decentralized and social planner versions of 
this model, present their steady-state solutions, and explore their comparative 
statics and transitional dyn.gmics.  Section 4 looks at the policy implications 
arising from the model while Section 5 concludes. 
2  Financial Innovations and the Financial Sec- 
tor 
2.1  Financial Innovat ions 
We  now  discuss in a little detail the characteristics, types, and benefits of  fi- 
nancial innovations. Llewellyn (1992) believes that the ultimate criterion when 
judging financial innovation is the extent to which it increases the e£Eciency of 
financial intermediation in particular and the functions of  the financial system 
in general. Moreover, he asserts that it is possible to draw a parallel between 
financial innovations and similar processes in  other industries.  A computer 
hardware company, for  example,  seeks to enhance its competitive position 
in the marketplace by offering fundamentally new products, or by improving 
upon the technical characteristics of  existing products, and by combining into 
one machine the characteristics of  various existing machines, In the process, 
the basic function of  'computing7  becomes more efficient.  Similarly for finan- 
cial firms,  which can invent a brand new  class of  products, modii existing 
products, or combine the characteristics of  several different products, thereby 
making financial intermediation more efficient. However, Llewellyn points out 
that a fundamental difference between financial innovations and technological 
innovations is that there are no protective patents in the financial industry. In 
finance, the characteristics of  innovation are immediately visible and can be 
almost simultaneously copied by competitors.  Why then do financial innova- 
tions still occur? Vaaler (2001) argues that the 1980's and 1990's saw a flurry 
of  new financial products and services despite such innovations being costly 
to develop by  pioneers and easy to imitate by  rivals.  Examining one class 
of  financial innovations (asset-backed securities) and one particular innovator 
(Citicorp), he suggests that the paradox might be explained by  examining cu- 
mulative first-mover performance effects across related product and geographic market contexts. 
Llewellyn's  (1992)  analysis of  the nature of  financial innovations reveals 
two central aspects: 
1. The creation of  new financial instruments, techniques and markets; 
2.  The unbundling of  the separate characteristics and risks of  individual 
instruments and their reassembly in different combinations. Through a process 
of  "'spectrum filling", financial innovations can theoretically produce a range 
of  instruments which encompasses dl  possible permutations of  characteristcs. 
This moves the financial system closer to the Arrow-Debreu  ideal where all 
transactors can ensure for themselves delivery of  goods and services in all future 
contingencies. Anow and Debreu (1954) demonstrate that the existence of  risk 
can be an impediment to the efficient allocation of  resources unless there exists 
a complete set of  contingent commodity markets. In principle, therefore, the 
creation of  new instruments moves closer to an approximation of  the number 
of  'states of  nature'. 
2.1.1  Types of Finanical Innovations 
Acc:ording  to Llewellyn, the plethora of  characteristics of  a financial product 
(which is a financial innovation made in the past) include: 
1.  Price risk, that is, the extent to which the price of  an asset or liability 
may change; 
2. Earnings risk, such as the difference between equity and loan contracts; 
3.  Credit risk, that is, the possibility of  a default; 
4.  Pricing formula; 
5. Conversion characteristics, such as the extent and cicumstances in which 
the instrument can be converted into something else; 
6. Size of  the facility; 
7.  Exchange rate risk; 
8.  Discretion, or the extent to which the instrument allows either the issuer 
or bolder to exercise a discretion, for example an options contract; 
9.  Hedging facility, or the extent to which an instrument enables risks to 
be avoided. Examples here include forward contracts. 
Bearing these characteristics in mind, one possible classification system for 
finimcial innovations developed by BIS (1986) separates them into: 
1.  Risk-transferring innovations, which  either reduce the risk  (price risk 
or credit risk) inherent in a particular instrument or alternatively enable the 
holder to protect against a particular risk; 
2.  Liqudity-enhancing innovations, such as securitized assets which enable 
loam to be sold in a secondary market which offers the lending institution the 
capacity to change the structure of its portfolio. Credit-generating innovations widen the access to particular credit markets and may increase the total volume 
of  credit. 
3.  Quity-generating innovations, which  have the effect of  giving an  eq- 
uity characteristc (where the rate of  return on the asset is determined by the 
performance of  the issuer) to assets where  the nature of  the debt-servicing 
commitment is predetermined, for example,.a debt-equity swap. 
2.1.2  Benefits of  Financial lanovations 
Finally, Llewellyn (1992) lists some of  the benefits of  financial innovations: 
a. The costs of  financial intermediation may be reduced as they give bor- 
rowers access to a wider range of  markets and facilities and allow different 
institutions to exploit their comparative advantage. 
b. New instruments facilitate arbitrage between markets in different coun- 
tries and instruments and in principle erode pricing anomalies, thus reducing 
market imperfections. 
c.  Some instruments Gden the range of  hedging possibilities and enable 
risks to be protected against. 
d.  Some insturnents allow risks to be priced  and to be shifted to those 
willing and able to absorb them. 
e. Many instruments allow risks to be unbundled separately and "sold". If 
correctly priced, this enables the financial system to allocate resources more 
efficiently. 
One can discuss the efficiency of  the financial system in two different ways: 
structural  efficiency (the  range of  choice offered in the system and its adaptabil- 
ity to changing cirumstances and preferences of  users) and allocatzve efiiency 
(the ability of  the system to price risks accurately and  to allocate funds to 
where the risk-adjusted rates of  return are highest.) 
2.2  The Financial  Sector:  Innovators  and Intermedi- 
aries 
The financial sector in our model comprises financial innovators and financial 
intermediaries. The former produce new financial '%lueprints" (products and 
services) using labor that is chmelled away  from the production of  the fi- 
nal consumption good.  As  discussed above, these "blueprints" may  include 
innovations such as ATMs, phone and internet banking, derivatives of  exist- 
ing financial products (including new types of  options), initial public offerings 
(IPOs) of  companies and anything which enables funds to be channelled more 
effectively  from savers (households) to borrowers (firms seeking to raise capital to finance the purchase of  new plant and equipment). We  denote the stock of 
finmcial products (that is, old financial innovations) as T. 
Analogous to the Romer  (1990) specification of  the real R&D sector, the 
development of  the financial sector is characterized by an ever-expanding va- 
riety of  financial products.  For simplicity, there is no  "creative destruction" 
of  t?xisting  financial products by successively superior products.  However, the 
existing stock of financial innomtions/products affect the production of  new 
financial ideas according to 
where i  denotes the quantity of  financial innovations per unit time, u,  is the 
fraction of aggregate human capital allocated to the financial sector, and F, 
A,  and  q5  afe constants constrained to lie on  the  [0,1) interval.  The idea is 
of  a spillover effect from each financial innovation:  financial innovators may 
build upon the ideas of  other innovators to create a differentiated or an all-new 
financial product. 
Financial intermediaries, on the other hand, are responsible for intermediat- 
ing funds between borrowers and lenders. Borrowers are producers of  the final 
corlsumption good while lenders are households with savings.  The efficiency 
at which savings can be transformed into productive investment is  specified 
to be dependent on the existing stock of  financial innovations/products per 
adjusted unit of  human capital (r/Hn, which we  will label as J, 0 < K < 1)) 
which proxies for the state of  development and sophistication of  the financial 
sector. The capital accumulation function hence looks like: 
Y (t)  =  AK (t)&  (uy (t) H (t))'-&. 
' 
where Y denotes output, K is the stock of  capital, H is the stock of  human 
capital, A is  a (constant) technological parameter, uy  is the share of  human 
capital devoted to final goods produ~tion.~  , and 6  is the rate at which capital 
depreciates. By including tc in our measure of  trdormative efficiency 6, we 
are acknowledging that some hancial innovations may be rivalrous (such as 
.  the creation of each new  PO,  which may benefit from the knowledge gained 
from previous IPOs but nevertheless requires new labor to be expended in order  - 
'Pagano (1993) specifies the saving-investment relationship as #S = I,  where 1 -  4 is  the 
flow of  saving 'lost' in the process of financial intermediation. This (exogenous, in his case) 
fraction goes to banks as the "spread between lending and borrowing rates, and to securities 
brokers and dealers as commissions, fees and the like" (pp. 614615). to tailor it to the needs of  individual firms) while others are not (such as a new 
financial instrument, which may in fact benefit from "thick market" effects as 
it becomes more widely traded). By restricting n to lie strictly between 0 and 
1, we  are saying that in the aggregate, financial innovations or products are 
neither fully rivalrous nor fully non-rivalr~us.~ 
In the steady state, r/Nn  must be constant by  definition.  Therefore, the 
rate of  financial innovations in the steady state must equal n  times the growth 
rate of  human capital. Why does the number of financial products continually 
increase in the steady state even when all savings are completely transformed 
into investment? We  argue that as per-capita income continues to rise (at a 
constant rate) in the steady state, so does the volume of  funds that has to 
be intermediated. Due to the rivalrous nature of  some financial products and 
services, this rising volume results in congestion and decreased efficiency in 
the financial sector unless more financial products are devised to alleviate the 
strain on it. Loosely speaking, resources such as human capital must continue 
to be directed to the financial sector as it services an expanding economy. 
2.2.1  The Financial Sector  and Human Capital Accumulation 
The financial sector affects the accumulation of human capital in the following 
way:  the stock of  financial products r (which proxies for the level of  financial 
development) affects the rate at which new human capital is generated H. 
.Z?  (t) = D (uH  (t)  H(t))?  ~(t)'  -  bHH  (t), 
where UH  is the share of  human capital devoted to new human capital pro- 
duction, 6H is the rate at which human capital depreciates, and q and /3  are 
elasticity parameters constrained to take on values between 0 and 1. For sim- 
plicity, we  assume that human capital production is relatively human capital 
intensive so that we  can omit physical capital in the production function. This 
human capital accumulation equation collapses to the Lucas (1988) specifica- 
tion if q = 1  and /3 =  0. As discussed in the introduction, however, there exists 
a significant body of  research indicating that financial development enhances 
human capital accumulation  by removing borrowing constraints which hitherto 
prevented poorer households from accessing capital markets to finance the ac- 
quisition of  human capital.  It is reasonable, then, to believe that ,f3  > 0.  We 
make the assumption that these bendits on human capital accumulation are a 
by-product of  financial development and that financial intermediaries cannot 
extract the rents associated with these benefits. 
21f  K  = 1, then all financial wroducts are strictly rivalrous;  if  K  = 0,  then all  finan- 
cial products are strictly non-rivalrous, so that the efficiency of  financial intermediation is 
dependent only on the stock of  financial products and independent of  population size. The Model 
In ,this  section, we  take an in-depth look into the structure of  the decentralized 
version of  the model.  We  explain the roles played by its key components: the 
final goods sector, the human capital production sector, the financial sector (in- 
coporating financial innovators and financial intermediaries) and households, 
and examine their interactions.  We  then lay out the optimization problem 
faced by  a hypothetical social planner, and proceed to show its steady-state 
solution. Finally, we  examine the comparative statics of  this model as well  as 
its transitional dynamics. 
3.'1  The Decentralized Model 
3.31.1  Final Goods Production. 
The final goods sector produces the consumption good Y using a Cobb-Douglas 
technology to combine human capital Hy  (equal to uyH,  where uy  is the share 
of  human capital, H, devoted to final goods production) and capital K: 
Y  = K~H;-&.  (1) 
A representative final goods producer thus solves the following profit max- 
imization problem: 
where wy  is the wage  in the final goods sector and r~  is  the rental price of 
capital charged by financial intermediaries.  The price of  the .final goods has 
been normalized to unity. 
The first-order conditions require that the wage and rental price of capital 
be equal to the value of their marginal products: 
3.1.2  Human  Capital Accumulation 
As explained in Section 2.2.1, human capital accumulation is assumed to take 
the following form: where  uk is the share of  aggregate human  capital  devoted to new  human 
capital production, and SH is the rate at which  hurnan capital depreciates. 
In the decentralized model, the spillover effect from financial innovation on 
human capital accumulation is not internalized by individual agents. 
Non-profit human capital producers (such as  schools and universities) charge 
housholds pH.  H to cover the cost of  hiring educators, wHuHH,  at every point 
in time.  Positive externalities from financial development on hurnan capital 
accumulation are not compensated. An  alternative specification, not explored 
here, is to have human capital producers (private schools/universities) max- 
imize profits TH  = PH .  fi -  wHuHH  but return these profits to households 
(say, through scholarships). 
3.1.3  The Financial Sector 
As  in  Chou  and Chin  (2001), the financial sector is  composed of  financial 
innovators and financial intermediaries-cum-venture capitalists.  The former 
are responsible for producing financial innovations, T, which then determines 
the degree of  sophistication of  the financial sector, proxied by 5 (equal to the 
ratio r/Hn,  or the number of  financial innovations per adjusted unit of  human 
capital).  A greater due  of  5 allows more efficient  intermediation between 
lenders (households) and borrowers (intermediate goods producers), resulting 
in a higher percentage of  savings being transformed into useful capital. 
Financial innovators are monopolists who  make extra-normal profits  by 
producing new financial products, using human capital as input, according to 
the production function 
+ = 2  (ZL~H)~,  (6)  - 
where F s FT$.  As in the human capital sector, financial innovators do not 
internalize the spillover effect from the existing stock of  financial products. 
They therefore treat 2  as exogenously given. 
The profit of  a representative financial innovator, to be maximized by  its 
choice of u,,  is 
T,  = Pr+ -  wruTH7  (7) 
where P,  is the price of  each financial innovation.  With these substitutions, 
the first order condition implies that 
From  this equation, we  see that the price  of  each financial innovation is a 
function of  the marginal factor cost of  labor in the financial innovations sector. 
This equation may also be interpreted as an inverse demand function for T. Downstream in the financial sector, financial intermediaries purchase inn* 
vations from financial innovators (which, in the real world, are probably sister 
divisions of  the same financial firms)  and use them in transforming savings into 
productive investment as well as in the funding of  real R&D activities  The 
financial intermediaries derive %heir  income from:  (a) charging the R&D firms 
the rate R, to finance their production of  new designs; and (b) by  charging 
finns in the (real) intermediate sector a higher interest rate (T~)  for renting 
capital than it pays out to households for their savings (TI,).  The interest 
rate differential, TK -  rv, may be thought of  as the commission charged for 
intermediating funds. For simplicity, we assume that financial intermediation 
requires no human capital input.  Financial intermediaries make zero profits 
as this sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive. 
In each period, the representative financial intermediary ensures that rev- 
enues received fiom the final goods sector equal the cost of  acquiring deposits 
from households and purchasing new products from financial innovators: 
3.1 .'4  Households 
Finally, to close the model, we  examine the consumption decision of  house- 
holds.  As  usual,  we  assume that this decision  may be characterized by  a 
representative consumer maximizing an additively separable utility function 
subject to a dynamic budget constraint. We use a conventional C1R.R.A  utility 
function and assume that households are ultimate owners of  all capital and 
shareholders of  hal  goods firms, financial intermediaries and financial inn* 
vators. The optimization problem is thus: 
subject to 
where v represents the flow of  households' stock of  assets (that is,.saving),  and 
n,  is the monopolistic profits from the financial innovators. The monopolistic 
profits  of  financial innovators, n,,  equal to revenue P,i  minus  labor costs 
w,u,W,  are paid out to households who are also shareholders of  these firms. In 
equilibrium, wages are equal across all labor markets, i.e. wy  =  w, = w~  =  Ilr. Using these facts and substituting the assumption pH&  = wrruHH  made in 
Section 3.1.2  and the intermediation condition rKK  +  %T  = rVK  + PT+  into 
(11) and (12) reduces the intertemporal budget constraint to 
We can show that the price of  financial innovations is determined by  the 
following arbitrage equation: 
The opportunity cost to a financial intermediary of  purchasing a financial 
innovation, crKPT,  must be equal to the average flow of  savings intermediated 
by a unit of financial product, v/r,  and the associated capital gain,  P~. 
The solutions for the steady-state levels of  u~ and u,,  the shares of  labor 
devoted to the human capital production sector and the financial innovations 
sector respectively, are shown in Appendix A. Using numerical simulations, we 
can demonstrate that their steady-state levels are lower in the decentralized 
model compared to their counterparts in the social planner's solution, the focus 
of the nextsub-section.  The sources of  divergence are the positive externalities 
flowing from existing financial products to financial innovations and human 








Figure 1:  Flowchart of  the Economy 3.2  The Social Planner's Model 
3.2.1  Model Set-Up 
The hypothetical social planner solves the following optimization problem: 
K (t)  =  E(t) [AK (t)'  (uy (t) H (t))'-'  -  C (t)] -  ~KK  (t) ,  (16) 
i(t) =  F(~~(t)~(t))*r(t)~,  (17) 
H (t)  =  D  (uH(t)H  (t))"  (t)' -  bHH (t) ,  (18) 
uH  (t)  =  1 -  U~ (t) -  uT  (t)  (I91 
E(t)  E  r(t)/L(t)".  (20) 
where the variables are as defined in the decentralized model.  Note that cr  E 
(0, I), {UY (t) ,  UT (t) ,  UH(~))  E  [O,l]  Vt  and (8, p, 6~,  6~,n)  > 0.  To make the 
model as general as possible, we  again allow the financial innovations sector 
and human capital production sector to take on any type of  scale of  production 
at this st  age. The only requirements are that {A, q) 6  (0,  :L]  and (4, P) i  [O,l]. 
As is standard, the model is solved using optimal control methods.  Drop 
ping time subscripts, the Hamiltonian is 
where v, p, and T are the co-state variables corresponding to the state variables 
K, T, and H respectively. The control variables are C, uy, and'  UH.  Unlike the 
competitive model, the socid planner internalizes the spillovers from exist- 
ing financial products on financial innovations, as well  as the spillovers from 
financial products to human capital production, 
The first-order conditions are -fi  = -  8H -  v (~AcYK~-'  (uy  H)  I-a -  6~)  , 
8K  (25) 
-p  = -  -  A  @-I  8H -  vH-~  (AK'  (uy  H)'-'  -  C)  + pF4  (u~H)  T 
87- 
+TD  (UHH)"T~-~  ,  (26) 
and the transversality conditions are 
limv(t)  K(t) =  0, 
t-+ccr 
lirnp(t)r(t) =  0, 
tdbo 
limn (t)  H (t) =  0. 
tdM 
3.2.2  Solving the Model 
First define the physical capital to human capital ratio, K/  H, as k, and the 
consumption to human capital ratio, C/H,  as c. We  characterize the balanced 
growth path of  the model as one where these two ratios and c (the stock of 
financial products per adjusted unit of  human capital, r/Hn)  are constant in 
the steady state.  In addition, the shares of  human capital allocated to the 
final goods, financial innovations and human capital production sectors (uy, 
u,  and UH respectively) are also constant in the steady state. On the balanced 
growth path, output per unit of  human capital, Y/H, is fixed so the growth 
rate of  human capital is also the growth rate of  output in the economy. 
Before deriving the steady state solutions of c, k, c, uy  and u,,  we now 
show that the steady state properties of the model imply restrictions on  IC 
and 0, the parameters indicating the  average degree  of  rivalry in financial 
innovations and the elasticity of  spillovers from financial products on human 
capital production. 
Since i/(  = 0 in the steady state and 5  E r/HK,  y,  =  ny~,  where 7,  G  i/r 
and YH = H/H. In addition, from i  = Fu$HXr",  we have i/~  =  Fu:H~T@-~. 
Taking the logarithms of  the latter equation and differentiating both sides with 
respect to time, and using the fact that u,  and y,  are constant in the steady 
state, yields y,  = XyH/ (1 -  #I)  . Therefore Moreover, as H = D (uHH)"  TP -  SHH,  it follows that yH = DU>H"-'T~ -  SH. 
Taking the growth rates of both sides of  this equation and recalling that UH 
and YH  are constant in the steady state yields y~ =  py,/(l -  7).  Reconciling 
the two equations linking y, and yH implies the restriction 
The steady-state solutions for the five unknowns k, c,  C$,  uy and u, are 
obtained by transforming the first-order conditions into five equations asserting 
that klk =  2/c = i/C$  e  uy/uy =  cT/uT  = 0. These equations may be written 
as: 
where YH  =  Du&tB -  SH and UH = 1 -  UY -  u,. 
By further manipulating these five equations, we can show that the steady- 
state solution to UH,  u$, is obtained implicitly from 
where 
and This last equation then yields u:  as well as u*y = 1 -  u:  -  u;l.  In addition, 
we  can sequentially obtain 
3.2.3  Comparative Statics 
Due to the complexity of  the analytical solutions, we  utilize simulation tech- 
niques to investigate the comparative statics of  the model.  Specifically, we 
analyze the impact of  a change in 9,  p,  P, F, and D  on the three shares of 
labor u:, u*y and u;l, as well as the growth rate of  the economy,.y>. The com- 
parative statics are performed with respect to a particular parameter holding 
the other parameters constant. They should be interpreted relative to the base 
model with the following set of  baseline values: 
The results are presented in Fig.2 and  Fig.3 and are summarized in the box 
below: 
An  increase in the discount rate p predictably results in a reallocation of 
human capital to the final goods sector from the human capital production 
and financial innovations sectors.  Since these two sectors are the engines of 
growth in the economy, the steady-state growth rate, yh, declines. An increase 
in 8, the measure of  risk aversion or preference for consumption smoothing, 
produces the same qualitative effects as an increase in 8. 
A rise in  p, which measures the elasticity of  spillovers from financial de- 
velopment on human capital accumulation, raises the steady-state g-rowth rate 
of  the economy, as do increases in D  and F, the productivity parameters in 
the human capital and financial innovations production functions respectively. Increases in D  and F also result in an reallocation of  human capital from the 
human capital and final goods sectors into the financial innovations sector. 
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Figure 3: Simulated Comparative Statics for the Steady-State Shares of 
Labor Allocated to the 3 Sectors 3.2.4  Tkansitional Dynamics 
The large dimensionality of  the model  (with 3 control variables and 3 state 
variables)  necessitates the use of  numerical methods when  investigating its 
trartsit ional dynamics.  Specifically, we  convert the model from continuous to 
discrete time and use the "shooting" method (implemented in a Glanguage 
computer program) to guess the magnitude of  the jumps in the control vari- 
ables c, uy, and u,  occuring in the instant a shock impacts the system.  "Cor- 
rect" jumps ensure the system moves along the stable manifold until the new 
steady state is reached while incorrect jumps  lead to dynamic paths which 
eventually violate the transversality conditions. In this section, we report the 
response of  the state and control variables to a positive innovation in F. These 
are illustrated in Figure 6, which for clarity's sake is not drawn to scde. 
Figure 4:  ImpulseResponse Functions for an Increase in F 
A rise in F  raises the marginal product of  labor of  financial innovators, 
causing the share of  labor in the financial sector, u,,  to jump upwards. Con- 
versely, this causes the share of  labor in the final goods and human capital 
sectors, uy and UH ,  to jump downwards in order for the marginal productivity 
of labor in these sectors to match that of  the financial innovators. (Recall that both find goods and human capital production exhibit diminishing returns 
with respect to human capital.) uy and u,  then slowly converge to their final 
levels; the change in F results in a steady-state reallocation of  labor from the 
final goods sector and the human capital production sector to the financial 
innovations sector. The share of  labor in the human capital production sector, 
UH,  at first continues to decline after the initial jump  as  uy  recovers faster 
than the decline in u,,  and then rises gradually back to its original level. 
By affecting the marginal product of  labor of  financial innovators, the in- 
crease in F raises the mges received by  households, causing consumption to 
jump up instantaneously. As more labor is channelled into the financial innova- 
tions sector and less into the final goods sector, capital accumulation declines 
until the increased efficiency of  the hancid intermediaries (due to rising [, 
the stock of  financid products per adjusted unit of  human capital, arising from 
u,  being above its old steady state level) increases the rate of  accumulation 
of  capital and hence output. Consumption eventually reaches its new, higher 
steady-state level. 
4  Policy Implications 
Our comparative statics exercise shows that increases in the productivity para- 
meters in the human capital and financial innovations sectors, D and F, raise 
the steady-state growth rate of  the economy. The steady-state growth rate is 
also positively related to the magnitude of  the spillover effect from financial 
development on human capital accumulation. This suggests that policymakers 
should try to encourage the development of  financial products that are partic- 
ularly effective in helping households finance the direct costs and opportunity 
costs of  schooling. They should also endeavor to make the educational sector 
more efficient and productive. 
Deregulation of  the hancid sector may  lead to increased  productivity 
of  financial innovators (captured in our model  by  a rise in F), which  raises 
the steady-state growth rate of  the economy.  (We can  show  that when F 
is too low, the economy may never achieve a 100 per cent transformation of 
savings into investment, i.e.  [  < 1  in the steady state.)  Similarly, opening 
the financial sector of  a less developed economy to leading-edge financial firms 
from advanced countries will enable a transfer of  financial expertise from these 
countries to the less developed one, allowing the latter to raise its F parameter 
and thereby attaining a higher steady-state growth rate.  This effect is not to 
be confused with the issue of  increasing capital flows between countries. 
Finally, the divergence of  the decentralized solution from the planner's in 
this model  suggests a  reason  for the desirability of  mergers  in  the finance industry.  As  firms in the industry become fewer in numbers but stronger in 
market power, they begin to internalize the spillovers from current to future 
financial innovations. (If  the industry consists of  only one monopolistic firm, 
then it would  in effect behave like the social planner with regards to such 
externalities.)  This may  account for the recent consolidations and mergers 
observed in the financial sector. 
5  Conclusion 
In tllis paper, we  explored the inter-relationship between financial development 
and human capital accumulation. Financial development is brought about by 
financial innovations, a human capital-intensive activity, which improves the 
efficiency of  financial intermediation.  The rise in efficiency of  financial inter- 
mediation in turn increases the pace of  human capital accumulation. In the 
real world, for example, financial development alleviates borrowing constraints 
which may have previously prevented some housholds from acquiring hurnan 
capital. 
We  used a formulation of the financial sector first demonstrated in Chou 
and Chin (2001) in the context of  a growth model with endogenous technolog- 
ical progress. Our financial sector comprises financial innovators and financial 
intermediaries.  Financial innovators utilize human capital and the existing 
catellog of  financial products to develop new financial products and services. 
Finmcial intermediaries then purchase these innovations to improve their effi- 
ciency in transforming household savings into productive investment by firms. 
Finmcial innovations also have a positive spillover effect  on  hurnan capital 
accumulation, with the aggregate stock of financial products affecting the rate 
at which new human capital is produced.  We then explored the interactions 
between final goods firms, the human capital production sector, financial in- 
novators, financial intermediaries, and  households,  explaining in  detail the 
objective function and constraints faced  by each entity in our model of  the 
macroeconomy. 
Comparing the solution to this decentralized, competitive model with that 
of  a hypothetical social planner revealed two sources of  divergence:  the share 
of  human capital allocated to the financial sector is lower in the decentralized 
model because financial innovators do not internalize the positive externalities 
of  current financial innovations on future innovations and on human capital ac- 
cumulation. This suggests that governments should perhaps play an active role 
in encouraging financial development, and that mergers and consolidations in 
the finance industry may enable firms  to take into greater account the spillover 
froin one financial innovation to the next.  In addition, our comparative sta- tics exercise suggests that policmakers should try to raise the efficiency and 
productivity of  the financial innovations and human capital sectors, possibly 
through the deregulation of  the financial sector and by reducing the amount of 
bureaucratic red-tape in the educational sector.  Finally, policymakers should 
also encourage the development of  financial products that assist in the financ- 
hg  of  human capital accumulation. 
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A  The Decentralized Model 
The Hamiltonian is 
We  can show that the solution to u;I is obtained implicitly from 
where and 
As  in the planner's  model, this equation then yields u:, as well  as u;  = 
1 -  u:  -  u;1.  In addition, we  can sequentially obtain 
The difference between the decentralized model and the planner's version is 
the absence of  the tam  -nyj,  4 + ~3)  from the right-hand side of  equation  ( 
(38). As stated in Section 3.1.4,  our simulations show that u:  is smaller in the 
decentralized model for all reasonable choices of  parameter values. 
Note that depreciation is dropped here for simplicity. 
B  Mat hematical Not  at  ion 
C = consumption 
p = subjective discount rate 
0 = coefficient of  risk-aversion in the utility function 
6 =  rate of  depreciation 
t = time 
K = physical capital 
H = human capital 
uy =  share of  human capital devoted to production of  final consumption good 
u, = share of  hunan capital devoted to production of  financial innovations 
u~ = share of  human capital devoted to production of  new human capital 
T = stock of  financial innovations 
- 
[  r  T/H" = efficiency of  intermediation between savings and investment 
c f  C/H = consumption to human capital ratio 
k m K/H =  physical capital to human capital ratio 
..-r 
k z K/AL = technology-augmented capital-labor ratio 
y:  = steady-state growth rate of  the stock of  financial innovations 
yk  = steady-state .growth rate of  human capital 
A = (constant) technology parameter wj = wage rate in sector j 
rv = interest rate on transformed savings earned by households 
r~ = interest rate paid by financial intermediaries by borrowers (firms) 
n,  =  profits earned by a financial innovator 
P, = price of  a financial product 
PH = price of  one unit of  human capital 
cr == capital's share of  income generated in final goods production 
X == elasticity of  financial innovation production with respect to human capital 
4 == elasticity of  financial innovation production with respect to the existing 
stock of financial products 
n == a measure of  the average degree of  rivalry in financial products 
q = elasticity of  human capital production with respect to existing human 
capital 
,O  ==  elasticity of  human capital production with respect to the stock of  financial 
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December 11,  2001 1  Financial Sector 
A representative firm in the financial sector produces financial innovations 
according to the following function: 
where I'  G FT~,  L,  I  u,L,  Lf  nL,,  {a,  b}  > 1, E  E [O, 11  and X  E (0,l). 
a tlenotes the relative productivity of  foreign workers compared to domestic 
workers while  E  measures the degree of  skill diffusion from foreign workers 
to domestic workers. When E = 1  full diffusion takes place so that domestic 
workers become as productive as foreign ones. G?  denotes the ratio of  foreign 
workers to domestic workers employed in the financial sector. The financial 
innovator seeks to 
where wf = h,.  The first-order conditions Bir,/BL,  = 0 and 8x,/aLf  yield 
the following wage equations for the two types of  workers: 
Given the equilibrium condition w,  = wy = G, we  can obtain an equation 
for P,  through equation (3) and then substitute it into equation (4) to get 
1 
a(l-~)X  1-x 
n=  . 
Substituting the equations for P, and Cl  into equation (2) yields the following 
equilibrium profits for the financial sector: 
-0, 
where bn  f  (~l-~/b)l-~.  In the steady state, we need to write the price of 
each financial innovation as 
P,  iiru,  [I +  bL?]  -  prep-  Ll-n  XY,~ 
,  (6) 
where K =  A/  (1 -  q$), y,  n  i/r  and J r  r/L6.  Note that at every point in 
time, the following intermediation condition must hold: 
rKK  = rvK + P,i.  (7) 2  Final Goods Sector 
A representative firm  in the final goods sector seeks to 
where Ly s  uy  L and Q E (0,l).  The first-order conditions an-y  /@K  = 0 
and &ry  /dLy yield the following equations respectively: 
- Q~ka-l  1-4  TK -  U~  I  (9) 
wy  =  6 = (1 -  Q)  Akauya,  (10) 
where k r  K/L. 
3  Domestic Households 
A representative domestic worker seeks to 
where cd  = Cd/L,  subject to 
K~  =  ~:(T,K~+  W~UYL+  W~U~L-  cd),  (12) 
i =  FaEA  (1  +  bR) (%L)* ,  (13) 
rKK =  rvK +  Pri,  (14) 
K  =  Kd+Kf,  (15) 
1 =  uy +UT,  (16) 
where .$  = r/i",  r  L +  Lf = (1  +nuT)  L, Kd = kdL  and  Kf -  kfLf  = 
kfauTL. 
4  Foreign Households 
A representative foreign worker seeks to 
bO  C1-@2 , 
max  Ufio  = 1  :-62 
l e-(~z-fi~t)tdt, 
f 
where cf E  Cf /L and l?. =  u,/u,  +  n, subject to 
K~  = i (T,K~  +  W~L~  -  cf), 
rKK  =  rvK +  P,i, 
K  =  Kd+Kf, 
1  =  Uy  +  uT. 5  Optimal Control Problem with respect to 
Domestic Households 
+,upaEx  (1 + bbl) (u,~)'  .  (22) 
The control variables are cd  and uy, the state variables are Kd and T,  and 
the costate wiables are vd  and p.  The first-order conditions for the control 
vari%bles aHd/acd = 0 and  dHd/a~y-  = 0 yield  the following equations 
respectively: 
where  = rvKd + wyuy  L +  wTu,L -  Cd.  The first-order conditions for 
the state variables are given by equations (12) and (13).  The fmt-order 
conditions for the costate variables 8&/aKd  = -Cd  and  aHd/a~  = -,L 
yield the following equations respectively: 
fi  -- -  - APdx  (1  +  bbl) (u,L)* re-' 
!ihT L(l+bQ)  v 
,u  &%+  *  dd. 
Finally, the transversality conditions dictate that 
lim  Kd (t)  vd  (t) =  0, 
t+w 
lim  T  (t)  p (t) =  0. 
t+CO 6  Optimal Control Problem with respect to 
Foreign Households 
where the control variable is  cf,  the state variable is Kf,  and the costqte 
variable is uf-  The first-order condition for the control variable 8Hf  lacf =  0 
yields the following equation: 
The first-order condition for the state variable is given by  equation  (18). 
The first-order condition for the costate variable dHf/aKf  =  -fif  yields the 
following equation: 
Finallyy  the transversality conditions dictate that 
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